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Abstract A primary challenge for the safe integration of small 
UAS operations into the National Airspace System (NAS) is 
traffic deconfliction, both from manned and unmanned aircraft. 
The UAS Traffic Management (UTM) project being conducted at 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
considers a layered approach to separation provision, ranging 
from segregation of operations through airspace volumes 
(geofences) to autonomous sense and avoid (SAA) technologies 
for higher risk, densely occupied airspace.  Cooperative SAA 
systems, such as Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 
(ADS-B) and/or vehicle-to-vehicle communication systems 
provide significant additional risk mitigation but they fail to 
adequately mitigate collision risks for non-cooperative (non-
transponder equipped) airborne aircraft. The RAAVIN (Radar 
on Autonomous Aircraft to Verify ICAROUS Navigation) flight 
test being conducted by NASA and the Mid-Atlantic Aviation 
Partnership (MAAP) was designed to investigate the applicability 
and performance of a prototype, commercially available sUAS 
radar to detect and track non-cooperative airborne traffic, both 
manned and unmanned.  
The radar selected for this research was a Frequency 
Modulated Continuous Wave (FMCW) radar with 120 degree 
azimuth and 80 degree elevation field of view operating at 
24.55GHz center frequency with a 200 MHz bandwidth. The 
radar transmits 2 watts of power thru a Metamaterial 
Electronically Scanning Array antenna in horizontal 
polarization. When the radar is transmitting, personnel must be 
at least 1 meter away from the active array to limit nonionizing 
radiation exposure.  The radar physical dimensions are 18.7cm 
by 12.1cm by 4.1cm and it weighs less than 820 grams making it 
well suited for installation on small UASs.  The onboard, SAA 
capability, known as ICAROUS, (Independent Configurable 
Architecture for Reliable Operations of Unmanned Systems), 
developed by NASA to support sUAS operations, will provide 
autonomous guidance using the traffic radar tracks from the 
onboard radar.  
The RAAVIN set of studies will be conducted in three phases. 
The first phase included outdoor, ground-based radar 
evaluations performed at the Virginia Tech’s Kentland Farm 
testing range in Blacksburg, VA. The test was designed to 
measure how well the radar could detect and track a small UAS 
flying in the radar’s field of view. The radar was used to monitor 
5 test flights consisting of outbound, inbound and crossing routes 
at different ranges and altitudes. The UAS flown during the 
ground test was the Inspire 2, a quad copter weighing less than 
4250 grams (10 pounds) at maximum payload. The radar was set 
up to scan and track targets over its full azimuthal field of view 
from 0 to 40 degrees in elevation. The radar was configured to 
eliminate tracks generated from any targets located beyond 2000 
meters from the radar and moving at velocities under 1.45 
meters per second. 
For subsequent phases of the study the radar will be 
integrated with a sUAS platform to evaluate its performance in 
flight for SAA applications ranging from sUAS to manned GA 
aircraft detections and tracking. 
Preliminary  data analysis from the first outdoor ground tests 
showed the radar performed well at tracking the vehicle as it 
flew outbound and repeatedly maintained a track out to 1000 
meters (maximum 1387 meters) until the vehicle slowed to a stop 
to reverse direction to fly inbound.  As the Inspire flew inbound 
tracks from beyond 800 meters, a reacquisition time delay was 
consistently observed between when the Inspire exceeds a speed 
of 1.45 meters per second and when the radar indicated an 
inbound target was present and maintained its track.  The time 
delay varied between 6 seconds to over 37 seconds for the 
inbound flights examined, and typically resulted in about a 200 
meter closure distance before the Inspire track was maintained. 
The radar performed well at both acquiring and tracking the 
vehicle as it flew crossing routes out past 400 meters across the 
azimuthal field of view. The radar and ICAROUS software will 
be integrated and flown on a BFD-1400-SE8-E UAS during the 
next phase of the RAAVIN project. 
The main goal at the conclusion of this effort is to determine 
if this radar technology can reliably support minimum 
requirements for SAA applications of sUAS. In particular, the 
study will measure the range of vehicle detections, lateral and 
vertical angular errors, false and missed/late detections, and 
estimated distance at closest point of approach after an 
avoidance maneuver is executed. This last metric is directly 
impacted by sensor performance and indicates its suitability for 
the task.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
The NASA UTM project is conducting research to evaluate 
prototype technologies needed to safely integrate UAS 
operations into the NAS. The Federal Aviation 
Administration’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic 
Management (UTM) Concept of Operations states risk 
mitigation for UAS flights conducted beyond visual line of 
sight in Class G (Uncontrolled) airspace can be achieved with 
sense and avoid on-board equipment capable of continuously 
tracking the range, position and velocity of airborne objects in 
its vicinity to ensure a safe separation distance from other 
airborne vehicles is maintained. [1] Under this scenario, the 
sense and avoid sensor would relay the location and trajectory 
information of the airborne targets to the UAS ground control 
system to adjust the UAS vehicle heading or to enact an 
automatic contingency procedure to maneuver the UAS 
autonomously.  
The RAAVIN (Radar on Autonomous Aircraft to Verify 
ICAROUS Navigation) flight tests reported here were 
conducted to demonstrate a candidate sense and avoid 24.5 
GHz Doppler radar marketed for UTM operations to evaluate 
its capabilities to locate, track and alert the presence of 
airborne vehicles operating in the UAS’s vicinity for the 
purpose of autonomous maneuvering. The performance of the 
SAA radar is expected to replicate the function of an onboard 
human pilot, and have at least have the same field of view as a 
pilot in a cockpit, which is to about  +/- 110 degrees in azimuth 
and about +/- 15 degrees in elevation (relative to the aircraft). 
This coverage corresponds to the “see and avoid” task 
performed by a “manned” crew.  The radar should also revisit a 
track at least every 2 second and provide a minimum of a 20 
second warning of approaching traffic. [2] A NASA developed 
SAA algorithm ICAROUS, (Independent Configurable 
Architecture for Reliable Operations of Unmanned Systems) 
will use the real time radar tracking data to execute 
autonomous maneuvers to eliminate potential airborne 
conflicts. [3] 
II. GROUND TESTS 
A. Radar Setup 
The candidate UTM sense and avoid sensor selected for 
this research was a Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave 
radar with 120° azimuth and 80° elevation field of view 
operating at 24.55 GHz center frequency with a 45 MHz swept 
bandwidth. The radar transmits 2 watts of peak power through 
a Metamaterial Electronically Scanning Array (MESA) 
antenna oriented in horizontal polarization. The 22 dBi gain 
from the MESA antenna requires personnel to be at least 1 
meter away from the active array to limit nonionizing radiation 
exposure.  The radar’s physical dimensions are 18.7 cm by 
12.1 cm by 4.1 cm and it weighs less than 820 grams, making 
it well suited for installation on small UASs. The radar has 
independent transmit and receive antenna arrays divided by a 
small aluminum metal fence to reduce cross talk coupling. The 
radar firmware version 12 was used during the ground test 
evaluation. Enhancements to improve the performance of the 
Kalman filter have been achieved in later firmware versions.  
The radar is controlled using a command line interface API 
software called BNET thru an Ethernet TCP protocol. Scripting 
commands are used to establish the radar’s operational 
characteristics including the search and track fields of view, 
parameters to govern the tracking Kalman filter, range and 
velocity masking options to help reduce false tracks, and data 
logging selections. Radar detections are generated every time 
the radar is able to detect a Doppler target.  Detections may or 
may not turn into radar tracks depending on the radar masking 
settings defined in the startup script command. The radar track 
and detection data packets are recorded in binary (.bin) files.  
By default, detection packets are transmitted at a rate of every 
beam step period, 6.72 msec, while Track data packets by 
default are transmitted every 4.98 Hz which gives about 210 
msec between every update. The user cannot modify the 
detection transmit rate, but the track data transmit rate can be 
configured to transmit at the user specified track update rate in 
the range (0.0, 5.0) per second. In later firmware versions the 
update rate has increased to 10 Hz. 
The ground tests were conducted with the radar field of 
view configured to scan 120 degrees in azimuth and 0 to +40 
degrees in elevation. To reduce the potential for false tracks, 
the masking commands were set to only monitor targets out to 
2000 meters with radial velocities between 1.45 and 30 meters 
per second and an estimated radar cross section greater than     
-20 decibels per square meter. To ensure new tracks were 
identified as quickly as possible, the minimum reporting 
confidence level was set to 15 (out of 100). All other radar 
command settings were placed at the recommended default 
values to track airborne UAS.   
The radar was mounted on a tripod at a height of 
approximately 5 feet above the ground facing 227 degrees from 
true north at 0 degree pitch and roll. The radar location was 
measured to be at approximately 526.7 meters above sea level, 
at 37.196297 degrees latitude and -80.578373 degrees 
longitude based on reference measurements made from the 
GPS location of the Inspire’s launch position.  The radar 
orientation and position are approximations, and not absolutes.  
The radar uses a right handed Cartesian coordinate system 
that is fixed to the face of the antenna to determine where 
antenna radiation is pointed relative to the radar aperture. The z 
axis is the broadside direction normal to the face of the radar. 
The y axis is the vertical direction in the plane of the radar 
aperture. The x axis is the horizontal direction and points from 
right to left in the plane of the antenna face. Azimuth is defined 
as the angle measured from the z axis toward the x axis. 
Elevation angle is defined as the angle between the pointing 
vector and the xz plane. 
B. Flight Test Approach 
The stationary radar was used to track an airborne UAS 
target flying outbound, inbound and crossing routes in 5 
separate flights. The UAS used in these tests was the DJI 
Inspire 2.  The Inspire has a maximum takeoff weight of less 
than 10 pounds and can achieve velocities of up to 93 
kilometers per hour. The outbound flight paths typically took 
the Inspire away from the radar at a -15 degrees azimuth angle 
out to a range distance of around 1000 meters at a traveling 
 velocity of 14 meters per seconds. The Inspire was then slowed 
to a stop, reversed course direction and maintained the same 
inbound trajectory back to the radar. The farthest outbound 
flight carried the Inspire out to a range of 1350 meters. The 
Inspire was flown at an altitude of either 60 or 120 meters. The 
majority of the flights were flown in this manner with slight 
variation in heading. Flight 5 had one route flown at a velocity 
of  7 meters per second. The crossing route flights were 
conducted at varying boresight range distances out to 400 
meters.  A total of 12 outbound/inbound routes were flown and 
3 crossing routes. 
C. Radar Data Processing 
A Python script was developed to parse the radar generated 
track.bin files to enable data analysis.  The parser application 
opens the radar track .bin files, parses the binary data found in 
these files, then stores the parsed information into new ASCII 
formatted .csv files that can be viewed and manipulated in 
common spreadsheet applications such as Microsoft Excel for 
future plotting and analysis.  The parsed .csv files contain all 
variables found in the track  packets available for analysis, 
including  x, y, z, coordinate locations, azimuth, elevation, and 
range coordinates, velocity, confidence level, estimated radar 
cross section (RCS), lifetime of the track and sample 
acquisition time. The parser also calculates two additional 
outputs used in the data analysis.  The total velocity, which is 
calculated from the radar velocities given in x, y, and z 
coordinates, provides a measure of direct correlation to the 
speed of the Doppler target regardless of direction. The relative 
recorded time from the first track point is also calculated to 
provide a standard time base between tracks and is used as the 
x-axis for the data plots.  To expedite plotting and analysis of 
the .csv files, a LabVIEW based application was developed.  
The plotting routine retrieves individual data points assembled 
in the tracking .csv data files and automatically generates data 
plot curves viewable in Microsoft Excel.   
The DJI Inspire 2 flight control system logs binary files on-
board which contain the position and velocity data necessary to 
validate the radar tracks. The binary files were downloaded 
post-flight and converted into CSV format using DatCon3.4. 
The resulting data included timestamped data and GPS data 
including 3D position and velocity data. The Inspire velocity 
data was synchronized in time with the radar tracking data to 
establish the relative time delay between when the GPS derived 
velocity data indicated the Inspire had exceeded a velocity of 
1.45 meters/second and when the radar reacquired its track on 
inbound routes.  The Inspire's timestamped data showed about 
an extra 48.662 second time drift over an actual 1173 second 
flight; thus, the data needed to be linearly scaled by a factor of 
1.041 to match the timing of the radar data. The GPS velocity 
data was plotted against the radar measured total velocity data 
on a synchronized time scale to calculate the time required to 
identify a new track showing the Inspire was approaching the 
radar location.  
D. Radar Analysis 
The radar tracking data for the 5 flights were plotted and 
compared to the Inspire’s onboard flight control log data to 
determine the general performance of the radar.  The radar and 
GPS data were imported into Google Earth visual software to 
overlay the radar track with the Inspire’s flight path.  Fig. 1 
presents the Google Earth map with the superimposed flight 
and track data for flight 1. The white trace in the image is the 
radar data. The GPS data is the red trace. The radar data aligns 
well with GPS coordinates of the Inspire during the 3 
outbound/inbound routes. The radar traces which are not 
associated with the Inspire’s flight route are believed to be 
from birds in the area. In addition to the Google Earth data 
comparisons, the radar’s range, azimuth, elevation, total 
velocity, confidence level, estimated radar cross section (RCS), 
and track lifetime data were also plotted against relative time 
for each flight. Analysis of the combination of these plots 
provided a means to establish when the radar was and should 
have been tracking the Inspire, versus when tracks were from 
birds, road traffic or other unidentified targets. Generally 
speaking, the track data was very clean and no identifiable 
clutter such as from moving tree branches were observed. The 
tracks in the data that were not from the Inspire could usually 
be traced to flying birds and road traffic being observed in the 
radar’s field of view. Google Earth map overlays were made 
for each flight for analysis, but only data for flight 1 will be 
presented. 
The radar range verses time plot proved to provide a good 
indication of when the Inspire was being tracked. The range 
data, combined together with the radar total velocity data and 
Inspire’s GPS velocity data, provided a means to establish 
when the Inspire should be observable and tracked by the radar 
based on its GPS velocity exceeding 1.45 meters per second.  
Fig. 2 shows these three data curves plotted on the same 
relative time axis for flight 1.  The left y-axis presents the 
velocity in meters per second and corresponds to the GPS 
velocity curve in blue and radar velocity curve in red. The right 
y-axis is radar range in meters and corresponds to the gold 
curve. The x axis is the synchronized relative time of the track.  
The range data shows the Inspire is first tracked at about 70 
meters and maintains the track out to around 850 meters, when 
the Inspire stops to reverse course. The flight profile of the 
Inspire indicated it entered the radar’s field of view at 40 
degrees elevation, which equates to the 70 meter range distance 
Fig. 1. Google Earth Map displaying flight 1 GPS data and radar tacks 
 Fig. 2. Radar range, velocity and GPS velocity plot for flight 1. 
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at the 60 meter flight altitude. The Inspire’s return inbound 
route was first tracked at around 574 meters at 88.2 seconds on 
the relative time scale during the first pass.  The radar 
maintained the Inspire’s track as it flew back to the radar, 
stopped, reversed course and continued its outbound journey to 
well past 1000 meters on its second pass. As it returned on the 
inbound pass, the radar reacquired the Inspire for about a 
second and a half at 733 meters out before losing it for 
unknown reason. The return track is then reacquired and 
maintained from a distance of 627 meters out. The radar 
continues to track the Inspire as it reverses direction, climbs to 
120 meters for its third outbound pass, and flies out to over 
1000 meters. On the inbound route, the Inspire track is picked 
up again at 828 meters. 
The GPS velocity data only provides absolute speed and 
shows the Inspire maintains a steady speed of 14.4 meters per 
second in both outbound and inbound flights. The 
corresponding radar velocity data also indicates the direction of 
the flight. The radar velocity is positive when the Inspire is 
flying away from the radar and negative when Inspire is 
closing in on the radar. The radar data showed the Inspire 
typically maintained a speed of around 15.4 meters per second. 
The radar tracker derived velocity was found to have a 
calculation error based on the tracker update speed which was 
assumed to be 200 milliseconds. But in reality the tracker is 
updated about every 210 milliseconds.  This caused the tracker 
to overestimate the target velocity by 5 to 10%.  The velocity 
derivation has been corrected in later radar firmware versions.  
The GPS velocity data curve indicates the moment in time 
when the Inspire exceeds 1.45 meters per second. The range 
data curve shows the time when the inbound track is 
reacquired.  The difference between these two times is the 
warning time of an incoming target. In the first inbound pass 
for flight 1, the radar responded in 20.2 seconds. On the second 
pass, the radar tracked the incoming Inspire for 1.5 seconds 
before losing the track. The track was not maintained until 
267.5 seconds. The GPS velocity data indicated the Inspire 
exceeded the 1.45 meters per second radar track threshold 
velocity at 236.8 seconds making the warning time of 30.7 
seconds. The warning time of the third inbound route was 14.4 
seconds.  
Table I presents a summary of the radar performance 
metrics, highlighting the maximum outbound range track 
distance and the inbound warning times for flight 1. The radar 
azimuth and elevation angles are included in the table to verify 
the Inspire was within the radar’s field of view and ensure the 
validity of the warning time calculation. The inbound acquired 
track distance used in the tables were selected from the point in 
time where the track was held and not dropped intermittently. 
On the second inbound pass in flight 1, the radar did track the 
Inspire for 1 ½ seconds prior to maintaining a steady lock.  The 
radar confidence level for the 1 ½ second track did not get 
higher than 40%. Other flights had similar occurrences where 
the inbound route was tracked intermittently before 
maintaining a steady lock.  The data used in the radar 
performance summary tables for the inbound track distance 
was chosen to be the point in time when the radar maintains a 
steady lock and the track would eventually reach a 100% 
confidence level. The confidence level of the reacquired radar 
track data point used in all summary tables was 15%.  
Fig. 3 presents the radar range, velocity and GPS velocity 
data for flight 2 in the same format found in Fig. 2.  Flight 2 
consisted of two outbound/inbound routes with a maintained 
velocity of around 14 meters per second. The first route was 
flown at 60 meters altitude, the second at 120 meters. The radar 
range data curve indicates the Inspire was tracked out to over 
1000 meters in both passes. The radar reacquired the inbound 
Inspire at a range of 859 meters at 60 meters altitude and 
maintained lock at a range of 780 meters at 120 meters altitude.  
This resulted in an 11 second and 18.4 second warning time 
respectively.  A summary of the radar performance metrics are 
shown in Table II. 
Fig. 4 presents the range and velocity data plot for flight 3. 
The Inspire flew essentially the same mission profile in flight 3 
as in flight 2. The first outbound route was flown at 60 meters 
altitude, the second at 120 meters altitude.  The radar tracked 
the Inspire out to a range of 1043 meters in the first outbound 
and to 1039 meters in the second. The radar maintained the 
inbound tracks starting at a distance of 709 meters at 60 meters 
altitude and 750 meters at 120 meters altitude. The resulting 
warning times were 21 and 19.6 seconds, respectively. Table 
III shows a summary of the radar performance metrics for 
flight 3. 
In Fig. 5, the radar and velocity data are presented for flight 
4. There were 4 outbound/inbound passes flown in Flight 4. 
The first outbound route was flown at 60 meters altitude out to 
a range 870 meters. The next two outbound routes were flown 
 Fig. 3. Radar range, velocity and GPS velocity plot for flight 2. 
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Fig. 4. Radar range, velocity and GPS velocity plot for flight 3. 
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Fig. 5. Radar range, velocity and GPS velocity plot for flight 4. 
TABLE IV: FLIGHT 4 RADAR PERFORMANCE SUMMARY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
at 120 meters altitude and took the Inspire out past 1000 
meters.  The final outbound route was the farthest of all the 
flights and achieved a range distance of nearly 1400 meters at 
120 meters altitude. The radar was able to reacquire and 
maintain the inbound tracks for all 4 passes. The radar warning 
time for the 4 inbound passes was calculated to be 30, 19.5, 7 
and 33 seconds respectively. The Flight 4 radar performance 
summary is shown in Table IV. 
Flight 5’s range and velocity data are shown in Fig 6. Flight 
5 offered the most diverse flight profiles, with 2 unique 
outbound passes and 3 crossing routes. It also had many more 
tracks that were related to the Inspire’s flight, making the 
analysis a bit more difficult.  The first outbound pass was 
flown at 14 meters per second at an altitude of 120 meters. 
Rather than stopping to reverse course as in all other flights, 
this route was flown with the Inspire making a roundabout turn 
without stopping.  The GPS data shows the Inspire’s minimum 
speed during the turn was 12.4 meters per second. The track 
was carried out to a range of 1069 meters. Maintaining speed 
around the turn enabled the radar to reacquire the Inspire on the 
inbound route at the furthest range distance of all the flights 
measured at 1024 meters. Since the GPS velocity data is an 
absolute value, it does not indicate the time when the Inspire 
has a heading back to the radar, making the warning time 
calculation subjective.  Therefore, to complete the analysis for 
this event, it was assumed the inbound flight occurred at 
approximately halfway between the loss of track and reacquire 
times (at 195 seconds). 
The second outbound route was also unique in that the 
Inspire was flown at 7 meters per second at 120 meters 
altitude. The radar tracked the Inspire out to a range of 932 
 Fig. 6. Radar range, velocity and GPS velocity plot for flight 5. 
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meters when it stopped to reverse course. On its inbound route, 
the range data shows the Inspire was first picked up at a range 
of 977 meters, which is the only time an inbound track was 
acquired beyond where the outbound track was lost. The 
Inspire was flying at 7 meters per second, which had some 
influence on the reacquisition range closure. This particular 
track was dropped, and three other intermittent tracks were 
recorded before the track was maintained at a range distance of 
725 meters.  Having the criteria that a track must be maintained 
and reach 100% confidence level to be used in the warning 
time calculation, the 4 intermittent tracks caused the longest 
warning time in all the flights at 37.7 seconds.  
The next 3 passes in flight 5 were composed of complex 
flight paths with crossing routes, making analysis more 
difficult. The timing of the crossing routes cannot be discerned 
by only looking at the range plot. Accurate analysis required 
examination of the Google Earth map overlay to identify the 
Inspire radar tracks from the large number of close in radar 
bird tracks. The radar’s azimuth, elevation, RCS, confidence 
level and lifetime plots were also examined. The passes with 
crossing routes took the Inspire outside of the azimuth radar 
field of view. This prevented an accurate assessment of the 
radar warning time. The radar was able to track and reacquire 
the Inspire in the crossing routes as it entered and exited the 
radar field of view, but no additional radar performance 
metrics were established.  Table V shows a summary of the 
radar performance metrics for the two outbound/inbound routes 
in flight 5. 
III. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 The RAAVIN (Radar on Autonomous Aircraft to Verify 
ICAROUS Navigation) flight test being conducted by NASA 
and the Mid-Atlantic Aviation Partnership (MAAP) was 
designed to investigate the applicability and performance of a 
prototype, commercially available sUAS radar to detect and 
track non-cooperative airborne traffic, both manned and 
unmanned. The RAAVIN set of studies will be conducted in 
three phases. The first phase reported here, included outdoor, 
ground-based radar evaluations performed at the Virginia 
Tech’s Kentland Farm testing range in Blacksburg, VA. The 
test was designed to measure how well the radar could detect 
and track a small UAS flying in the radar’s field of view. The 
radar was used to monitor 5 test flights consisting of 
outbound, inbound and crossing routes at different ranges and 
altitudes. The UAS flown during the ground test was the 
Inspire 2, a quad copter weighing less than 4250 grams (10 
pounds) at maximum payload. The radar was set up to scan 
and track targets over its full azimuthal field of view and from 
0 to 40 degrees in elevation. The radar was operated using the 
software version 12, and configured to eliminate tracks 
generated from any targets located beyond 2000 meters from 
the radar and moving at velocities under 1.45 meters per 
second. 
 The ground radar tests showed the radar performed well 
at acquiring and maintaining a track on the Inspire as it 
routinely flew outbound routes to beyond 1000 meters until 
the vehicle slowed to a stop to reverse direction to fly 
inbound.  The maximum distance tracked was 1387 meters. 
Inbound routes were analyzed to determine the warning time 
delay between when the Inspire was flying at a speed of 
greater than 1.45 meters per second and when the radar 
maintained a track that achieved 100% confidence level, 
alerting the presence of an airborne target. As the Inspire flew 
inbound tracks from beyond 800 meters, the warning time 
delay varied between 6 seconds to over 37 seconds. The 
higher warning times were a result of initial tracks being 
dropped before the radar was able to maintain the inbound 
track. The radar performed well at both acquiring and tracking 
the vehicle as it flew crossing routes out past 400 meters 
across the azimuth field of view.  
 For subsequent phases of the RAAVIN study, the radar 
and ICAROUS will be integrated and flown on a BFD-1400-
SE8-E UAS sUAS platform to evaluate its performance in 
flight for SAA applications ranging from sUAS to manned 
GA aircraft.   The airborne testing will incorporate version 13 
of the radar software with improved Kalman filtering features. 
At the conclusion of this effort, the study is aimed to 
determine if this radar technology can reliably support 
minimum requirements for SAA applications of sUAS. In 
particular, the study will measure the range of vehicle 
detections, lateral and vertical angular errors, false and 
missed/late detections, and estimated distance at closest point 
of approach after an avoidance maneuver is executed. This last 
metric is directly impacted by sensor performance and 
indicates its suitability for the task. 
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